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COMMENTS
THE IMPLICATIONS OF WAITS v.
FRITO-LAY FOR ADVERTISERS WHO USE
CELEBRITY SOUND-ALIKES
The Right to Privacy,1 one of the classics of legal scholarship,2
focused in part on an increased intrusion of the print media into
private life.3 It examined the protections available to private indi-
viduals who were subjected to the "mental pain and distress"4 of
1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890). The authors reviewed cases that appeared to protect a person's "right 'to
be let alone,'" id. at 195 n.4 (quoting COOLEY ON ToRTs 229 (2d ed. 1888)), and con-
cluded that a broader right to privacy merited common law recognition. Id. at 196.
Warren and Brandeis went on to state that the right to avert public exposure, "to
protect one's self from.., a discussion by the press of one's private affairs, would be
... [an] important and far-reaching one." Id. at 213. For a discussion of the historical
development of the right to privacy before the Warran & Brandeis article, see SAMUEL
M. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE MOROWTZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY §§ 2.1-.5 (1964).
2 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). Dean Prosser
called the article "the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon
the American Law." Id. The work has also been described as the "article which
launched a tort." Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is
Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611,
612 (1968).
3 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. The right of privacy was first articu-
lated in 1890 due to concerns about the media "overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency." Id. Warren and Brandeis warned that
newspapers had the potential to "belittle[ ] and pervert[ ]... the thoughts and aspira-
tions of a people." Id. They were primarily concerned with the growing prominence of
gossip, id. at 195, and believed that the print media had "invaded the sacred precincts
of private and domestic ife... and threaten[ed] to make good the prediction that
'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.'" Id. at 195.
For a thorough and well-researched discussion of the background and context of
the article, see Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 A iz. L.
REV. 1 (1979). In her commentary, Professor Glancy corrects many of the myths sur-
rounding the publication of the article. Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 2, at 383-84
(examining Warren and Brandeis' motivations to write article).
4 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
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what was characterized as an "evil" invasion of privacy.5 As the
law developed,6 however, the privacy rights of public figures7 and
celebrities diminished.8 Under the right of privacy as it evolved,
average citizens could prevent their likenesses from being used
commercially, 9 but public figures, such as a football player ac-
tively seeking press coverage, could not.10 To correct this ineq-
uity, the courts have developed a separate privacy right," the
5 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
6 For a discussion on the development of the tort right to privacy, see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 (5th ed.
1984). This material traces the development of the right to privacy from Warren and
Brandeis' article through modem common law applications. Id.
The modern law of privacy comprises "four distinct kinds of invasion of four dif-
ferent interests of the plaintiff." Id. at 851. These interests are linked only by the
plaintiff's "right to be let alone." Id. Dean Prosser first published this four part model
in 1960. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 389. Prosser described the invasions upon the
right of privacy as: "(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude .... (2)
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts .... (3) Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light .... (4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness." Id.
7 See Prosser, supra note 2, at 410. Prosser defined a public figure or celebrity as
"one who by his own voluntary efforts has succeeded in placing himself in the public
eye." Id.; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 851-66 (5th ed. 1984) (expanding
public figure definition to include "anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person"); see also MICHAEL F. MAYER, RIGHTS OF
PRIVACY 193-94 (1972) (noting increasing recognition of individuals as public figures).
"Accused murderers, witnesses to crime ... and mere individuals with strong opinions
also share the [public figure] limelight." Id. at 193.
8 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 203
(1954). "[A]lthough the well known personality does not wish to hide his light under a
bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph and likeness
reproduced and publicized without his consent or without remuneration to him." Id.
at 204. Similarly, Warren and Brandeis implied that even public figures should be
entitled to a right of privacy, at least to the extent that the matter has no relation to
their public capacity. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 215.
9 See Beverly v. Choices Women's Medical Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991).
In Beverly, the court held that the plaintiff, a physician, could prevent her likeness
from being used in a calendar that was distributed by a non-profit family-planning
organization. The court found that the calendar qualified as an advertisement under
N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Consol. 1982) and therefore the organization had to re-
ceive the plaintiff's consent in order to avoid liability for invasion of privacy. 587
N.E.2d at 276.
10 See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir.) (holding that col-
lege football player's right of privacy was waived when he put himself in public eye),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941).
11 See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28.01 [3]
28-7 (3d ed. 1992). The right of privacy protects against invasions of self-esteem,
whereas the right of publicity protects against commercial loss. Id. "[P]rivacy is a
personal and mental right, publicity is a commercial and business right." Id. at 28-8.
A state's interest in granting a separate right of publicity lies in protecting the indi-
242
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"right of publicity,"12 which allows celebrities to control and profit
from their own fame. 3 Although originally conceived to apply
only to a performer's "name or likeness,"' 4 the protection has
grown to include such things as the sound of a singer's voice.'
5
vidual's economic interest. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 573 (1977); see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 283
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[Wlhen a 'persona' is in effect a product .... the appropriation by
another of that valuable property has more to do with unfair competition than it does
with the right to be left alone."), aff'd sub nom, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[The two rights are clearly separable.
The protection from intrusion... and protection from appropriation.., are different
in theory and in scope."). For an argument that the right of publicity has slowly ma-
tured into a tort unrelated to the right of privacy, see McCARTHY, supra.
12 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 859-60. The right of publicity developed to
protect celebrities and other public figures who waived their right to privacy. See id.;
Nimmer, supra note 8, at 204; Prosser, supra note 2, at 411-19. The right of publicity
first emerged in Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d.
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Judge Frank argued that a "prominent person"
would feel deprived if they no longer received money for the use of their name or
likeness. Id. at 868. The court acknowledged that public figures have unique interests
and distinguished the right of publicity from the right of privacy by differentiating
between economic harm and emotional harm. Id. at 868. It is an "exclusive right to
make money from one's popularity and prominence." RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A
PUBLIC SOCIETY 133 (1987).
For a discussion of the historical development of the right to publicity, see gener-
ally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the As-
sociative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); Harold R. Lordon, Right
of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553 (1960);
Nimmer, supra note 8.
13 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562. In Zacchini, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the existence of a state law right of publicity as a tort independent of the right of
privacy. Id. The Court summarized the differences between the two rights by noting
that privacy plaintiffs seek to "minimize publication of... damaging matter, while in
'right of publicity' cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing." Id. at 573.
See also Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.) ("The
famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the com-
mercial use of their name and personality."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); MAYER,
supra note 7, at 221 (noting increased recognition of legal relief for misuse of person-
ality for profit in trade or business).
14 See Prosser, supra note 2, at 401; HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, § 1.5.
15 For an analysis of cases involving the unauthorized use of a performer's voice,
see Cheryl L. Hodgson, Note, Intellectual Property - Performer's Style - A Quest for
Ascertainment, Recognition and Protection, 52 DENY. L.J. 561 (1975); Leonard A.
Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny: Sounding off on Sound-Alikes,
57 FoRDHAN L. REV. 445 (1988). In order to adequately protect the celebrity's eco-
nomic interest, Wobl advocates the adoption of a right of publicity that includes voice
appropriation. Id. at 460; cf Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 326 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that anonymous use of plaintiff's voice did not infringe celeb-
rity's right of publicity).
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Recently, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,16 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a $2,475,000 award, holding
that damages need not be based solely on the fame of the per-
former 1 7 and that the unauthorized imitation of a singer's voice
violated the Federal Lanham Act' 8 as well as the singer's common
law right of publicity.19
The plaintiff in Waits was a singer-songwriter 20 who, before
this particular case arose, had emphatically denounced the use of
an artist's image for commercial purposes. 2' The defendants, a
manufacturer of corn chips and its advertising agency, hired a
"sound-alike" for a radio commercial despite their knowledge of
the plaintiff's disapproval of such endorsements.22 Upon hearing
the commercial, Waits promptly brought an action in federal court
claiming misappropriation under California common law and false
endorsement under the Federal Lanham Act.23 The jury found for
16 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
17 Id. at 1103. Although injuries from a violation of the right of publicity are
usually economic, the court has recognized injury for "humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental distress.'" Id. (quoting Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974)).
18 Id. at 1107; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
19 978 F.2d at 1102.
20 Id. at 1097. Waits has recorded over seventeen albums since his 1973 debut.
Id. His recent album BONE MACHINE (Island Records 1992) won a Grammy award for
Best Alternative Album. See Robert Palmer, Tom Waits, All-Purpose Troubadour,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1993, § 2, at 1, 10. In 1982, Waits was nominated for an Acad-
emy award for Best Musical Score for his work on the film ONE FROM THE HEART
(Columbia Pictures 1982). Id. In addition, Waits is an accomplished actor and
fledgling operatic composer. Id. Waits' film career goes back fifteen years and includes
performances with Jack Nicholson and Meryl Streep in IRONwEED (Tri-Star 1987) and
most recently with Lily Tomlin in Robert Altman's SHORT CuTs (Fine Line 1993). Id.
In a collaborative effort with director Robert Wilson and beat generation author Wil-
liam S. Burroughs, Waits recently composed a pop opera, THE BLACK RmER (1993). Id.
21 See Playboy Interview, PLAYBOY, March 1988, at 128. Waits criticized "artists
aligning themselves with various products, everything from Chrysler-Plymouth to
Pepsi. I don't support it. I hate it." Id. The court noted that Waits' policy is a very
public one. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097. For over ten years, Waits rejected "numerous
lucrative offers" and has repeatedly expressed his philosophy that endorsements de-
tract from the artist's "integrity." Id.
22 Waits, 978 F.2d 1098. The defendant acknowledged awareness of the plain-
tiff's disapproval of commercial endorsements. Id. In addition to the vocal imitation,
the defendant's advertisement used a "rhyming word play" similar to one of the plain-
tiff's songs. Id. at 1097.
23 Id. at 1098. Waits stated that he was angry and embarrassed when he heard
the "'corn chip sermon.'" Id. at 1103. Waits based his Lanham Act claim on the the-
ory that the imitation and parody of his song misrepresented his association with and
endorsement of the defendant's product. Id. at 1106; see Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43,
60 Stat. 441 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994)). "Any person who
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Waits and awarded him $375,000 in compensatory damages,
$100,000 in attorney's fees for violation of the Lanham Act, and
$2,000,000 in punitive damages.24 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision and the United States Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari.25
Writing for the court, Judge Boochever found that Waits had
successfully proved the elements of voice misappropriation es-
poused by the Ninth Circuit in Midler v. Ford.26 The court held
that Waits could recover for damages to his peace, happiness, and
feelings, 27 and for injuries to his goodwill, professional image, and
future publicity value.28 More significantly, the court decided that
punitive damages are available in voice misappropriation cases.29
Finally, the Waits court held that the Federal Lanham Act applied
to the facts of the case,30 and that Waits had standing to sue
under the statute.3 '
shall affix ... or use in connection with any goods or services ... a false designation or
representation... shall be liable to... any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false designation or representation." Id. Waits
complained that the sound-alike copied "the way I approach a phrase, the way I wait
before I start a phrase ... the hair on my voice ... scars in the same place." Steve
Harvey, Only in L.A, L.A. Timms, April 14, 1990, at B2.
24 978 F.2d at 1098.
25 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
26 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992). In Midler, the court
held that when a widely known and distinctive voice is "deliberately imitated in order
to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed
a tort in California." Id. at 463. The trial court in Waits focused on whether the de-
fendants had deliberately imitated Waits and whether Waits' voice was "sufficiently
distinctive and widely known to give him a protectable right in its use." Waits, 978
F.2d at 1100. Indeed, Waits' "voluble hipster cadences" and gravelly-gruff voice estab-
lished him as one of music's most distinctive voices. Palmer, supra note 20, at 1.
27 978 F.2d at 1103. Waits' public stance against endorsements permitted jurors
to infer that the commercial made him look like a hypocrite and humiliated him. Id.
28 Id. at 1104. Waits testified that his artistic reputation was based in part on his
stance against endorsements. Id.
29 Id. at 1105. Under California law, Waits was entitled to punitive damages if
clear and convincing evidence proved that the defendants' conduct was in conscious
disregard of his legal right to control the commercial use of his own voice. Id. at 1104;
CAL. CrV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1993). Evidence of the defendants' awareness of
Waits' outspoken policy against endorsements, and their willingness to go ahead even
though warned of the possible serious legal consequences, were sufficient to support a
finding that the defendants acted in conscious disregard of Waits' rights. 978 F.2d at
1105.
30 978 F.2d at 1107.
31 Id. at 1110. The court reconciled earlier Lanham Act decisions and found that a
plaintiff has standing under the Act when the interest asserted is a "commercial" in-
terest protected under the Act. Id. at 1108; see Malicki v. United Artists Communica-
tions, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that standing under Lanham
1994]
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It is submitted that Waits strengthened the Ninth Circuit's
position against voice misappropriation in two important ways.
First, the Waits court did not limit damages according to the per-
former's fame, 2 and second, it applied the Federal Lanham Act.33
It is proffered that Waits greatly extended the protection against
Act requires injury to plaintiff); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating that standing requires that plaintiff have "reasonable interest").
32 Id. at 1102. The court rejected the defendants' contention that the Midler stan-
dard required Waits be at least as well known as Bette Midler to recover. Id. Instead
the court stated that' '[wiell known' is a relative term, and differences in the extent of
celebrity are adequately reflected in the amount of damages recoverable." Id.; see in-
fra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussing Midler, Waits, and definition of
"well known").
33 Id. at 1107. Although the court characterized as "common sense" the conclu-
sion that an endorsement falsely implied through the use of a sound-alike gives a
celebrity standing under the Lanham Act, their own precedents question whether
such a plaintiff could have standing. Id.; see, e.g., supra note 31 (citing prior cases).
The Lanham Act confers standing to any person who believes that he is or is likely to
be damaged by the use of any such false designation or representation. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (West 1988). The plain language of the statute appears to permit a performer
who has his or her voice copied in an advertisement without permission to qualify.
Courts have found that consumers duped by false advertising, although "likely to be
damaged," do not have standing because they are not within the Lanham Act's in-
tended group of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
Because Congress directed the Lanham Act at unfair competition, the Ninth Cir-
cuit previously required that defendant's conduct "must not only be unfair but must
in some discernible way be competitive." Malicki, 812 F.2d at 1214; see ALPO Pet
Foods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina, 720 F. Supp. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (protecting consumers
under Lanham Act by allowing competitors cause of action); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l
Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1957, 1959 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (requiring "commercial interest" to
be protected). This posed somewhat of a problem to the Waits court. 978 F.2d at 1110,
n.10. Although Midler did not contain a Lanham Act cause of action, the court ad-
dressed the similar issue of unfair competition. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The court
noted in dicta that it would have denied Midler's unfair competition claim, stating
that "[t]he defendants were not in competition with her" because she "did not do tele-
vision commercials." Id. at 462-63.
In Waits, although Frito-Lay had violated the Lanham Act largely because Waits
"doesn't do" commercials, the Ninth Circuit faced the dilemma that Waits may not
have had standing because he does not do commercials. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097, 1107.
The court exited this revolving door by dividing Lanham Act plaintiffs into two
classes. Id. at 1109-10. The first class, parties claiming false advertisement, must still
show competition with the defendant. Id. at 1109. The second class, parties com-
plaining of false association or false endorsement, or both, need only demonstrate an
"economic interest akin to that of a trademark holder." Id. at 1110. It is suggested
that this was a simple and effective solution to the court's quandary. The division
permits those who were particularly harmed (performers with false endorsement
claims) to obtain standing without extending federal jurisdiction to every consumer
problem. See, e.g., Guarino v. Sun Co., 819 F. Supp. 405, 406 (D.N.J. 1993) (com-
plaining of price differential between Sunoco Ultra and Sunoco Regular gasoline).
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unwanted exploitation for all entertainers. Although this is a pos-
itive step, it is insufficient, leaving entertainers in need of even
greater protection.
This Comment suggests that although the court properly al-
lowed damages disproportionate to Waits' fame, it failed to pro-
vide useful guidance for future cases. Part I chronicles the com-
mon-law right of publicity, focusing on Midler, the case most
similar to Waits. Part II explores damages in voice appropriation
cases, and Part III discusses the Federal Lanham Act. Finally,
Part IV of this Comment examines with approval the court's find-
ing that the Federal Lanham Act applies to voice
misappropriation.
I. HISTORY OF THE CommoN-LAw RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The "right of privacy" was first tested in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 4 a 1902 New York Court of Appeals decision in-
volving the unauthorized use of a woman's picture to advertise
flour.35 The plaintiff was not a model and had no desire to pub-
licly display her likeness. 6 Under a right of privacy theory, she
sought to enjoin further publication and to collect damages for the
humiliation and embarrassment she suffered as a result of having
her appearance on flour boxes.37 Although the court refused to
apply the right of privacy theory,38 a strong dissent by Judge Gray
34 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
35 Id. at 442. Franklin Mills Company, one of the defendants, was "engaged in a
general milling business and in the manufacture and sale of flour." Id. The defend-
ants, "without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff... knowing that they had no
right or authority.., obtained, made, printed, sold, and circulated about 25,000 litho-
graphic prints, photographs, and likenesses of plaintiff." Id. The likenesses were dis-
played and conspicuously posted in "stores, warehouses, saloons, and other public
places." Id. People recognized the plaintiff's likeness and she claimed she was:
[G]reatly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have recognized
her face and picture on this advertisement, and her good name has been
attacked, causing her great distress and suffering, both in body and mind;
that she was made sick, and suffered a severe nervous shock, was confined to
her bed, and compelled to employ a physician.
Id. The plaintiff sought both to enjoin the defendant from further use of her likeness
and damages of $15,000. Id.
36 Id. at 443. The plaintiff did not claim to be "libeled by this publication of her
portrait." Id. at 442. The likeness was noted to be "a very good one" and the court
stated that some would find such publicity "agreeable," but the plaintiff found it "dis-
tasteful." Id. at 442-43.
37 Id. at 443.
38 Id. at 447. In an almost prophetic opinion, the court declined to accept the right
of privacy, fearing that:
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laid the foundation for future litigation.3 9 Judge Gray argued that
[T]he attempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily result... in a
vast amount of litigation... bordering upon the absurd... [and... it would
necessarily be held to include the same things if spoken instead of printed,
for one, as well as the other, invades the right to be absolutely let alone.... I
have gone only far enough to barely suggest the vast field of litigation which
would necessarily be opened up ....
Id. at 443. Although the court anticipated litigation "bordering upon the absurd," one
wonders what it would have made of White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (game show hostess protesting robot wearing wig, dress
and jewelry) or Iraq's objection to an advertisement featuring a picture of Saddam
Hussein. See Eben Shapiro, Rising Caution on Using Celebrity Images, N.Y. TiMEs,
Nov. 4, 1992, at D20.
The Roberson decision created "a storm of public disapproval, which led one of the
concurring judges to take the unprecedented step of publishing a law review article
explaining the decision." Prosser, supra note 2, at 385. At present, no common-law
right of privacy exists in New York. See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349
(N.Y. 1985). The public's only protection is the limited right of privacy granted by
§§ 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. Id. This statute was enacted in direct
response to the Roberson decision. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d
1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982). Section 50 states:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a mi-
nor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAw § 50 (Consol. 1982). Section 51 creates a civil remedy for vio-
lation of § 50. Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1320 (N.Y. 1982). § 51 provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written con-
sent first obtained ... may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name,
portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also..
recover damages for any injuries sustained ....
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAw § 51 (Consol. 1982).
39 Roberson, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that if the
plaintiff's "face or her portraiture has a value, the value is hers exclusively, until the
use be granted away to the public." Id. Judge Gray also noted the absurdity of the
idea that the court could protect against "the unauthorized circulation of an unpub-
lished lecture, letter, drawing, or other ideal property, yet would deny the same pro-
tection to a person whose portrait was unauthorizedly obtained and made use of for
commercial purposes." Id. at 451; see Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity: Star
Vehicle or Shooting Star?, 10 CnRDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1991) (discussing history
of right of publicity and its current status). It was three years before a court first
accepted the right of publicity. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga.
1905).
In Pavesich, the defendant utilized a likeness of the plaintiff, an artist, in a news-
paper advertisement. Id. The advertisement implied that the plaintiff owned the de-
fendant's life insurance when he did not, and had not consented to the use of his
likeness. Id. at 68-69. The court held that "the law recognizes, within proper limits, as
a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without his




the "plaintiff has the same... right to be protected against the use
of her face for defendant's commercial purposes, as she would
have, if they were publishing her literary compositions."4 °
In 1953, the Second Circuit faced a similar situation in Hae-
lan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.41 In Haelan,
the issue was whether a ballplayer could, by contract, grant an-
other the exclusive right to use his photograph in the sale of base-
ball cards.42 The Second Circuit held that an individual could
enter into such a contract. In doing so, the court expanded the
right of privacy by recognizing that the use of a celebrity in a com-
mercial venture has tangible economic value43 and by acknowl-
edging the existence of a "right of publicity."44
40 Roberson, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
41 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
42 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867. In Haelan, a ballplayer granted the plaintiff, who was
engaged in the sale of chewing gum, "the exclusive right to use [his] ... photograph in
connection with the sales of plaintiff's gum... [and] agreed not to grant any other
gum manufacturer a similar right during such term." Id. "[The] [diefendant, a rival
chewing-gum manufacturer, knowing of plaintiff's contract, deliberately induced the
ball-player to authorize defendant... to use the player's photograph in connection
with... [its] sales." and defendant did so use the photograph. Id.
43 Id. at 868. "[lt is common knowledge that many prominent persons,... far
from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements
.... "Id. "[The] right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be
made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
their pictures." Id.; see, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 575 (1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); see also MAYER, supra note 7, at 221.
It is noteworthy that courts have since held that the First Amendment is not
implicated when the use of a performer's likeness is purely commercial. See, e.g., Es-
tate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). Noncommercial speech is
still protected. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (news popularity poll);
Ann Margaret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (photo
from movie of actress); Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580
(N.Y. 1984) (magazine fashion photo); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10
(Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 352 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1976) (photograph of quarterback in news
article). Appropriation for biographical or fictional purposes may also offend the First
Amendment. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. 1339; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (fictional movie about dancing couple named "Ginger and
Fred" protected by First Amendment).
44 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. The court held that "a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture." Id. It is "immaterial" whether this right is labelled a "property" right
because that tag merely "symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth." Id. The court held that this right of publicity existed in addition to
and independent of the right of privacy derived from the New York Civil Rights Law
§§ 50 and 51. Id. The court provided that the right of publicity would be worthless
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Historically, the courts have applied the right of publicity to
protect against the unauthorized use of a person's name, like-
ness, 4 or identity," but did not extend this safeguard to the use
of a look-alike or sound-alike in an advertisement.47 Recently,
however, the Ninth Circuit expanded the scope of the right of pub-
licity in Midler v. Ford, when an advertiser imitated a well-known
singer.48
Midler was the first case to hold an advertiser liable for using
a "sound-alike" performer in a commercial. Bette Midler is a well-
unless it could be made subject to "an exclusive grant which barred any other adver-
tiser from using their pictures." Id.; see Prosser, supra note 2, at 406 (discussing "pro-
prietary nature" of right of publicity).
45 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prod., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982) (producing and selling plastic
busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.); Steven T. Margolin, From Imitation to Litigation:
Expanding Protection for Commercial Property Rights in Identity, 96 DicK. L. REV.
491, 491 (1992).
46 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974) (racing car driver recovering for appearance of distinctive automobile in maga-
zine advertisement for cigarettes); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (employing New York Civil Rights Law § 51 to safeguard Muhammad Ali
against magazine that published drawing of nude figure in boxing ring with his nick-
name, "The Greatest"); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(2d Dep't 1977) (Guy Lombardo, known as "Mr. New Year's Eve," successfully brought
action for exploitation of property rights and public personality when car commercial
depicted band leader playing his trademark song, "Auld Lang Sine," amid balloons,
streamers and party hats); see also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698
F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that noncopyrighted slogan associated with talk
show host invaded right of publicity even though "name or likeness" was not used);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979) (enjoining distribution of X-rated movie featuring costumes closely resembling
cheerleading outfits).
These cases indicate that courts tend to go beyond protecting a popular "name
and likeness," and find a violation of the right of publicity when there is an appropria-
tion for commercial use of some aspect of the performer's identity or persona. See
generally Robert M. Callagy & Gillian M. Lusins, Commercial Speech and Private
Rights, 806 PLI CORP. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 31 (1993) (discussing
right of publicity cases).
47 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717-18 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (finding use of look, dress, and sound-alike
actress singing "These Boots are Made for Walkin'" did not violate Nancy Sinatra's
rights). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (utilizing theory
of unfair competition instead of right of publicity). The court stated that unfair compe-
tition may arise when an imitation results in a mistake in identity between the origi-
nal and the imitation. Id. at 259. The plaintiff in Lahr argued that if this misunder-
standing transpired, the "defendant's commercial had greater value because its
audience believed it was listening to [the plaintiff]" rather than to an imitation. Id.
The court indicated that in such a situation a cause of action may arise. Id.
48 Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513
(1992).
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known singer4 9 who consistently disallows the use of her voice in
advertisements.5 ° The defendants hired an unknown singer who
impersonated Midler to near perfection in an automobile adver-
tisement.25 The Ninth Circuit held that in doing so, Ford Motor
Company violated the entertainer's right of publicity because it
"deliberately imitated [her distinctive voice] in order to sell a prod-
uct."52 The court awarded compensatory damages but did not
pass on the applicability of punitive damages. 3
II. DAMAGES IN VOICE APPROPRIATION CASES
A. Compensatory Damages: Award Not Limited By Fame of
Performer
The Midler court stated that voice appropriation violates the
right of publicity "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer
49 Id. at 461 (pointing to Midler's Grammy, multiple gold and platinum records,
and Academy Award nomination).
50 Id. The defendants attempted to get Midler to do this commercial and were
informed that she was "not interested" in doing any commercials. Id.
51 Id. The defendants employed one of Midler's former back-up singers, and she
imitated Midler to the best of her ability. Id. After the commercial aired, a number of
people told both Midler and the imitator that the recording sounded exactly like Mid-
ler. Id. at 461-62. The defendants did not use Midler's name or picture in the commer-
cial; therefore, the sole issue in the case was the "protection of Midler's voice." Id. at
462. The court compared Midler's claim to that raised in Sinatra, noting that Midler's
claim would similarly fail if she were claiming a "secondary meaning" to the song or
seeking to prevent the defendants from using the song. Id.
52 Id. at 463. The defendant claimed that federal copyright law pre-empted Cali-
fornia's common-law tort of the right of publicity, if one existed. Id. at 462. The court
found that a human voice could not be copyrighted, so no pre-emption existed. Id.
Copyrights protect only those "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression." Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)). The Midler court stated
that "[a] voice is not copyrightable... [tihe sounds are not 'fixed'" and consequently
found no pre-emption. Id. For a discussion on when federal law pre-empts misappro-
priation, see J. THoAn.s McCARTY, McCARTHY's DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 207 (1991).
The court did not hold that "every imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is
actionable... [but] ... that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely
known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appro-
priated what is not theirs and have committed a tort." Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. The
court held the "defendants here for their own profit in selling their product did appro-
priate part of [Midler's] identity." Id. at 463-64.
53 Midler v. Young & Rubrican, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641, at *3-*4 (9th Cir.
Sept. 20, 1991); see CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a) (1994) (allowing award of punitive dam-
ages only when defendant has been found guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice").
Because this tort had "only recently" been discovered, the court believed that the level
of "oppression, fraud or malice" required to impose punitive damages could not be
found. Midler, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641, at *3-*4.
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is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product."54 Using this standard, the Waits court had little diffi-
culty finding the plaintiff's voice distinctive. 5 A closer question
was whether Waits could satisfy the "widely known" criterion of
Midler.56
Although Bette Midler is practically a household name,5 7 the
same cannot be said of Tom Waits.5 As a result, the defendants
argued that Waits had "not achieved the level of celebrity Bette
Midler has, [and therefore] he is not well known under the Midler
standard."59 Defendants further requested a jury instruction stat-
ing that "a singer is not widely known if he is only recognized by
his own fans, or fans of a particular sort of music, or a small seg-
ment of the population."60 The Waits court found this narrow defi-
nition "crabbed" and instead viewed "widely known" as a relative
term, finding that variations in the celebrity status of different
performers could more appropriately be reflected in the damages
award.6 1
54 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
55 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993). In one pas-
sage, the court noted that his singing has been described as "[1like how you'd sound if
you drank a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack of cigarettes and swallowed a pack of
razor blades .... [aifter not sleeping for three days." Id. The court stated that al-
lowing the jury to use common sense when determining whether a voice is distinctive
was "entirely appropriate." Id. at 1102.
56 Id. at 1102. The court instructed the jury that "[a] professional singer's voice is
widely known if it is known to a large number of people throughout a relatively large
geographic area." Id. Defendants argued that Waits "is known only to music insiders
and to a small but loyal group of fans." Id. The court rejected this argument, stating
that "[wiell known is a relative term, and differences in the extent of celebrity are
adequately reflected in the amount of damages recoverable." Id.
57 See supra note 49 (indicating Bette Midler's notoriety).
58 See Richard Harrington, The Music Industry's Court Hits, WASH. POST, May
30, 1990, at C7. In addition, Harrington dryly suggested that Waits spend a good part
of his $2.5 million award "for a good publicist: most of the jurors said they had never
heard of him before." Id. Actually, when jurors observed the scruffy looking singer at
the start of the trial, many assumed they had been assigned to a criminal case. Paul
Feldman, Tom Waits Wins $ 2 1/2 Million in Voice-Theft Suit, L.A. TmEs, May 9,
1990, at B1. Said one juror, "when he left the court the first time, we thought he was
getting away." Id. However, agreeing that Waits is a "'prestige artist' rather than a
musical superstar," the court was much kinder than reporters. Waits, 978 F.2d at
1097. After explaining why the extent of his popularity was not crucial, the court
added that "Tom Waits is very widely known." Id. at 1102.
59 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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Indeed, a direct correlation always existed between the
"widely known" factor and any monetary recovery.6 2 It is pro-
posed, however, that any focus on the popularity of a performer is
partially misplaced. Common sense suggests that, all other
things being equal, a famous entertainer should be awarded
greater damages than a relatively unknown performer. Nonethe-
less, there are other factors of equal or greater importance. These
include how prominently the performer was featured in the adver-
tisement;63 how often the advertisement was shown and in how
many markets;64 the "quality" or "taste" of the appropriation;65
and what product was advertised.6 6 For example, the nature of
the product was significant when a beer manufacturer appropri-
ated the image of a young rap group to promote alcohol despite the
performers' public service campaign against underage drinking.67
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an entertainer's appear-
ance in any advertisement can be damaging when the performer
has repeatedly staked his prestige and reputation on denouncing
the commercialization of the music industry.6 8
62 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 82, 824 n.l1 (9th
Cir. 1974). The Motschenbacher court stated that "[g]enerally, the greater the fame or
notoriety of the identity appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic
injury suffered." Id.
Some scholars have gone so far to suggest that the award should be adjusted
depending on whether the jury found the voice appropriation in an "aided" or "un-
aided" manner. See J. THomAs McCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRvACY § 4.9, at
4-48 to 4-49 (1988). An "unaided" identification means that the jury could recognize
the similarity simply by hearing the defendans commercial. A finding would be
"aided" if it required the jury to hear both the authentic and sound-alike voices. Id. It
is suggested that this approach is unfair, as jurors are not required to recognize an
original passage in a plagiarism case. Ajury, representing six random members of the
public, does not accurately reflect how "widely known" a performer is.
63 See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984) (holding that violation exists even when look-alike is photographed in crowd),
aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095 (1st Dep't 1985).
64 See Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A-2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1974) (holding that no
violation occurs when exposure is extremely limited).
65 See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d. 1004, 1013 (1st Dep't 1981) (finding
that appropriation consistent with model's public image may affect damages but not
liability).
66 See Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826,838 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(considering nature of product advertised in sound-alike case).
67 Id.
68 See supra note 29 (noting Waits' outspoken policy against endorsements); see
also, Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing rela-
tionship between privacy rights and personal desire not to commercialize one's name);
Sharon Chester-Taxin, Will The Real Bette Midler Please Stand Up? The Future of
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B. Punitive Damages: Award Not Relative To Fame of
Performer
The most striking aspect of Waits, and the part most likely to
command the attention of entertainers and the advertising indus-
try alike, is the sheer magnitude of the award-$2.5 million.69
The major portion of the award, $2 million, was punitive,70 and
Waits is the first case to award punitive damages in a right of pub-
licity action.71 Removing any prior doubt regarding punitive dam-
ages, Waits clearly sends a message to advertisers that punitive
damages will be available for intentional misappropriation of ce-
lebrity voices in commercials.72
Some critics argue that the multimillion dollar punitive dam-
age award was excessive.73 Yet again, the complaints stem from
Waits' lack of commercial success.74  The critics urge that an
award given by a "sympathetic jury"75 should not be allowed to
overcompensate the realistic economic value of the commercial en-
dorsement.76 It is suggested that this position neglects a main
Celebrity Sound-Alike Recordings, 9 U. MIMIi ETr. & SPORTS L. REv. 165, 167 (quot-
ing Neil Young song that criticizes entertainers who endorse products).
69 See Recent Developments in Case Law, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 20, 23 (1992)
(summarizing Waits decision and emphasizing plaintiff's monetary recovery).
70 Id.
71 See text accompanying note 53 (awarding only compensatory damages); Waits,
978 F.2d at 1104. Despite the similarities between Midler and Waits, the Ninth Cir-
cuit awarded Waits punitive damages because he had something Midler did not: a
precedent. Id. at 1104-05. More specifically, when deciding whether to use a sound-
alike in their advertisement, the defendants were well aware of the three-month-old
Midler decision. Id. at 1105. They were concerned enough to check with an attorney
who counseled caution. Id. at 1098.
In California, punitive damages are available only when "the defendant has been
guilty of ... oppression, fraud, or malice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp.
1994). Malice is defined as "despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant
with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Id.
§ 3294(c)(1)). Because the defendants knew of the Midler decision but decided to use a
sound-alike anyway, the court was able to find the willful disregard required to allow
punitive damages. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104.
72 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104.
73 See Margolin, supra note 45, at 514 (arguing that "Waits award is clearly
excessive").
74 Id. at 514-15.
75 See Chester-Taxin, supra note 68. As Mario Aieta, a defense lawyer in the
Midler case noted, "Tom is nicer than Frito-Lay... [so] it's not surprising that the
jury found in his favor." Id.
76 See Margolin, supra note 45, at 514. "Viewed in a relative context, Waits was
awarded a minimum of twenty-five times the value of his contract for the alleged
wrong," as he would have received only one-hundred-thousand dollars had he actually
done the commercial. Id.
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point of punitive damages recovery set forth in section 908 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section states that "[i]n as-
sessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider
the character of the defendant's act . . . and the wealth of the
defendant." 7
It is submitted, therefore, that the court properly allowed a
punitive award that was disproportionate to the plaintiff's com-
mercial success. It is quite possible that Frito-Lay decided specifi-
cally to appropriate Waits' image because of his antiestablishment
style, hoping it would appeal to a particular audience.7 It seems
especially unjust to lessen the punishment of an advertiser who
preyed on a performer who spent his career actively avoiding com-
mercial endorsements and, to some extent, commercial success.
III. THE FEDERAL LANHAm ACT
In Waits, the Ninth Circuit also held that Frito-Lay violated
the Federal Lanham Act9.7  This was the first time in a voice ap-
propriation case that a court found a Lanham Act violation.8 0
This has two significant results. First, as a federal action, the de-
cision is persuasive authority in all jurisdictions and not just the
State of California."1 Second, the Lanham Act explicitly allowed
Waits to recover attorneys' fees, 8 2 which were unavailable under
the common-law claim.
77 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1989). Comment (e) further explains:
The wealth of the defendant is also relevant, since the purposes of exem-
plary damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future offenses,
and the degree of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgment is to
some extent in proportion to the means of the guilty person.
Id. cmt. (e) (emphasis added).
78 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1105-06.
79 Id. at 1107.
80 Id. at 1110 n.10. Although Midler attempted to amend her complaint to include
the Lanham Act, she was precluded by the court for technical reasons, viz., prejudicial
delay in filing the amendment. Id.
81 See Lowell Anderson, Recent Developments in Trademark Litigation, 804 PLI
CORP. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 661 (1993) (summarizing Waits and logi-
cal extension of decision); see also Sidco Indus. Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 768 F.
Supp. 1343 (D. Or. 1991) (action by motel owner under Lanham Act against casino
using similar name); Dakota Indus. v. Dakota Sportswear, 946 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.
1991) (action by trademark owner against trademark competitor under Lanham Act).
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117. This section provides in part that "[tihe plaintiff shall be
entitled.., to recover.., the costs of the action." Id.; see also, Sealy, Inc. v. Easy
Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that reasonable attorneys'
fees may be awarded in exceptional trademark cases, i.e., when infringement is mali-
cious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful).
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When Frito-Lay broadcasted its commercial employing the
Waits sound-alike, the Lanham Act stated "[amny person who, on
or in connection with any goods or sei-vices ... uses in commerce
• . .any false designation of origin ... shall be liable in a civil
action.""3 This language does not plainly implicate the use of a
sound-alike. In fact, prior to Waits the Ninth Circuit never ap-
plied these words to the "use" of a voice impersonator that gave
the appearance that a celebrity endorsed a product. Conse-
quently, in order to interpret the statute, the Waits court looked to
precedents from other jurisdictions and subsequent legislative
action. 4
The scope of the Lanham Act has been expanding steadily
since its enactment.8 5 Originally, it covered only an advertiser's
"passing off" of its goods as those of others.8 6 Although the Ninth
Circuit previously avoided the issue,8 ' other courts expanded the
Lanham Act's coverage to encompass "false endorsements."8 8
Section 43(a) of the Federal Lanham Act originally discour-
aged advertisers only from making false statements about their
own products.89 In 1989, Congress amended the Act to prohibit
advertisers from making false claims about products that their
competitors manufactured. 90 Further, this amendment clearly
83 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), amended by Trademark Law Revision Act (1988).
84 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106-07. Specifically, the court cited "persuasive judicial
authority and the subsequent congressional approval of that authority." Id. at 1107.
85 Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926
F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991). The court stated that "[a]lthough originally interpreted
narrowly, [the Lanham Act] now is considered to confer protection against a myriad of
deceptive commercial practices." Id.
86 See Helene D. Jaffe, Lanham Act Section 43(a): Standards and Trends, 806 PLI
CORP. L. AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 205 (1993). "Initially, the courts took a
narrow view of the statute, finding violations only when the advertiser passed off his
products as the products of a competitor." Id.
87 See Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 637 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (expressing
no opinion on applicability of Lanham Act), cert. denied, 642 U.S. 1120 (1983).
88 Frich's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 646 (6th Cir.),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). A false endorsement claim exists when consumers
will become confused and believe that the celebrity is actually endorsing the product.
Id.; see, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding plaintiff's Lanham Act claim proper when clothing store featured his look-
alike in magazine advertisement); Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp.
390, 394 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding protection of famous chef's likeness proper under
Lanham Act when coffee manufacturers used look-alike in commercials).
89 Siegrun D. Kane, False Advertising Under Section 43(a): The Courthouse Door
and Defendants' Coffers Open Wide, 361 PLI PAT., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND Lrr-




proscribed "false endorsement" claims previously excluded from
the statutory language.91
Given the Ninth Circuit's leap from "look-alike" to "sound-
alike" within the common-law right of publicity,92 and the wide
judicial and legislative acceptance of the application of the Lan-
ham Act to "false endorsement" cases, it appears only natural that
the court allowed Waits to use federal law against the defendant.
In the Ninth Circuit, at least, the use of celebrity sound-alikes
now clearly implicates federal law.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Waits decision is much more than a
sequel to Midler. Waits extends the right of publicity to protect
lesser known performers from voice appropriation. It was the
first, and so far the only, award of punitive damages in a right of
publicity action. Finally, by allowing the use of the Federal Lan-
ham Act, the Waits court opened all jurisdictions to the possibility
of voice appropriation claims, and encouraged these cases by
awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees.
The Ninth Circuit has become a pioneer in the area of voice
appropriation. Although the court stands alone, its message is
clear, and perhaps other courts will follow suit when the proper
case arises.
Patrick Buckley
91 Id. The amended act includes "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof... likely to cause confusion... as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another . . . commercial activit[y]." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), amended by Trademark Law Revision Act (1988). The modified passage
makes it clear that "false endorsement" claims, which would necessarily result in
"confusion... as to the affiliation" of the celebrity with the product, would be covered.
Further, the legislative history also reveals that Congress was pleased with the broad
interpretation of the Act. See S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1988), re-
printed in, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607.
Technically, the amendment was not in effect when Frito-Lay aired its commer-
cials. 978 F.2d at 1107. The Waits court did, however, take note of the fact that the
legislature had endorsed the expanding scope of the Lanham Act. Id. It cited these
changes and indicated that such expansive construction cemented its decision. Id.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussing Midler).
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